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at which pleases through mere intuition is beautiful,
that which leaves me indifferent in intuition […] is non-beautiful;
that which displeases me in intuition is ugly.
Immanuel Kant (MV, 29:1010)1
Studying Kant’s aesthetics one might suspect a striking omission; many have
done so. In arguing for his theory of pure reflective judgments of taste Kant
extensively analyses beauty, but almost wholly disregards ugliness. We com-
monly take ugliness as paradigmatic when we reflect on our negative aesthetic
judgments, and so does Kant. Consequently, there ought to be a more explicit
story explaining how Kantian judgments of ugliness are possible. And pre-
cisely here matters get complicated: it turns out to be a substantive question
whether Kant actually has any theoretical leeway for an explanation that ade-
quately captures the phenomenon of ugliness as we know it. Can Kant allow
for genuine judgments of ugliness?
Every time we make a pure aesthetic judgment—a judgment of taste—and
judge that something is beautiful, Kant’s famous description of what is going
on is that our cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding engage in
a harmonious free play. e pleasure that this free play results in is the ground
for our aesthetic judgment that a swan, say, is beautiful. Now, in account-
ing for judgments of ugliness we might propose to use the opposing idea of a
disharmony as explanans. Imagine an encounter with a warty toad. When we
judge this creature to be ugly, the proposed explanation runs, the faculties of
imagination and understanding clash and work against each other. is kind
of cognitive conflict results in the displeasure we feel when experiencing things
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like ugly toads. And this feeling of displeasure is the ground for our conclusion
that such an object is ugly.
is proposal is controversial, as it encompasses a rather bold reversal of
a key concept in Kant’s argumentation—is it really possible that the inverse of
harmony makes felt the distinct displeasure associated with ugliness? More-
over, how much sense does the very idea of disharmonious cognition or judg-
mentmake in light of Kant￿s transcendental philosophy? Recently Paul Guyer
(Guyer 2005) has forcefully argued that Kant’s epistemology does not allow for
such wayward cognition in the first place. We all remember the lessons from
the Critique of Pure Reasonwhere Kant argues that what partly constitutes any
experience is a co-operative functioning of cognition, and a disharmony can
hardly be understood as co-operative.
Despite these difficulties, in this paper I argue that a disharmony is the
key to understanding Kantian ugliness. is way, an answer to the question
of ugliness in Kant can be given in terms of a disharmonious free play of the
faculties of imagination and understanding. To appreciate this answer, it is
firstly required to get a more adequate understanding of what it is that is asked
for (§1). I will argue that the question as it is normally raised in the literature
already assumes too much of an answer. In §2 I touch on some relevant points
in Kant’s exposition of judgments of beauty, in order to understand the cogni-
tive functioning that underpins our positive and negative feelings in judging
appearances of things. Aer that, I reconstruct Henri Allison’s account (§3),
who defends the idea that a disharmonious free play can explain ugliness as
a negative judgment of taste. In response to this, I argue in §4 how Allison’s
account, and any account similar to it, cannot overcome Guyer’s epistemic ob-
jection. But I also argue that Guyer’s epistemological claim needs to be weak-
ened to avoid absurdity. is allows me to present a more modest proposal of
how to understand Kantian ugliness in the final section (§5).
1 Diagnosing the debate: catfish and Milton’s
Death
If we ask an explanation of ugliness in terms of Kant’s aesthetics, what pre-
cisely is the phenomenon that demands explication? What we take to be ugly,
to use Garrett omson’s imaginative examples, are things like crabs’ faces,
cows’ faeces, catfish, and monkey’s bottoms (omson 1992, p. 107). Given
this, it is all too easily supposed that, just as for us, ‘ugliness’ [Häßlichkeit] is
for Kant a term for nasty looks.2 Kant obviously defends that judgments of
beauty are based on how things appear to us. In fact, this is his key insight;
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that our way to experience pure beauty is in a judgment of taste, a judgment
based exclusively on the object’s formal presentation in intuition—it is based
on how an object appears to us. On this line of reasoning it might be equally
expected that, given that ugliness is about looks as well, also ugliness can be
recognised in a judgment of taste.
Sean McConnell, for instance, straightforwardly takes the apparent omis-
sion in Kant to be one of a pure judgment of ugliness; a negative judgment of
taste (McConnell 2008). Likewise, David Shier directly takes it thatwhatmisses
in Kant’s theory is a clear story about how ugliness is recognised in such a neg-
ative judgment of taste (Shier 1998, p. 412-13). Yet, any such starting point
seems to be inspired by our contemporary usage of ‘ugliness’ as a concept for
nasty looks. Before assuming that this also is what the author of the third Cri-
tique ought to account for, it must be considered that what Kant precisely held
to be the nature of ugliness might turn out to be more complex.
1.1 Kantian ugliness?
Kant recognises that ugliness exists. “Beautiful art,” he observes, “displays its
excellence precisely by describing beautifully things that in nature would be
ugly or displeasing” (CJ 5:312). He clearly sees an opposition between ugli-
ness and beauty. From this we might infer that to ugliness belongs an aesthetic
judgment, analogous to the judgment of beauty, but opposing it in relevant re-
spects. Logically, for any concepts to be opposites in the first place they must
at least have something in common, and it is plausible that here Kant holds
the aesthetic dimension to be the common factor involved in both beauty and
ugliness. In that way, beauty and ugliness mark endpoints of an aesthetic spec-
trum.
I contend that this is the right conclusion to draw: to ugliness belongs
an aesthetic judgment. But in making the inference, two points about Kant’s
aesthetics are crucial. e one is about the nature of the opposition, and the
other concerns the nature of judgments that are aesthetic. First, beauty and
ugliness are for Kant not contradictories but only contraries. No more than
one of these attributes (i.e. beautiful, ugly) can hold for a thing at a time, but it
is also possible that neither of them applies. is picture shows up clearest in
Kant’s logical writings, where he states that“ugliness is thus something positive,
not a mere lack of beauty, but also the existence of that which is opposed to
beauty” (LP 24:708).3 Accordingly, it is no logical truth that all not-beautiful
things are ugly, as they can be neutral as well. Another illustration here is the
three-valued model Kant oen repeats: ‘Beautiful – Neutral – Ugly’ (e.g. NF
15:296). is prominently gives aesthetic neutrality its place, separating beauty
and ugliness. Consequently, even if our inference about ugliness as involving
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aesthetic judgment is correct, a simple negation of his account of beauty looks
to be too coarse to do the work, as this takes neutrality on board as well.
e second point, which is vital, is that Kant uses ‘aesthetic’ notably
broader than we currently do: it strictly applies to all judgments pertaining
to feeling (CJ 5:204). So although his theory includes a reflective aesthetics
concerned with disinterested judgments of appearance of form, it additionally
encompasses both practical aesthetic judgments that makemoral value or use-
fulness felt, and pathological aesthetic judgments with a feeling due to visceral
sensation (FI 20:232). e first allow you to judge that a sunset is pretty, the
second that your broom has a good grip and excellent balance, and the last that
the hot footbath you take is gratifying.
It is important to note that practical and pathological aesthetic judgments
can never lead to the recognition of beauty. e reason for this is a metaphys-
ical one: Kantian aesthetic judgments are identified by what we can call the
‘subjective source’ of pleasure or displeasure. In other words, it is the source
of feeling that makes an aesthetic judgment of the kind it is.4 e important
point Kant wishes tomake is that whenwe experience beauty we feel a pleasure
brought about in a specific way, namely resulting from an unrestricted play of
imagination and understanding. It is this play that is the source that identifies
reflective judgments. Accordingly, given that practical and pathological judg-
ments by necessity differ in source, these different types of aesthetic judgment
can never lead to the recognition of beauty.
Kant is clear about the difference in source of the several aesthetic judg-
ment types. Practical aesthetic judgments have a solely intellectual, and patho-
logical judgments a solely sensuous source (CJ 5:208-9). By contrast, it is the
very core of theCritique of the Power of Judgment that reflective aesthetic judg-
ments have a source that is hybrid in quite a special way, conjoining both senses
and intellect. e upshot of this is that the general contention that ugliness
is recognised in an aesthetic judgment still leaves important questions open.
Surely, it does not invalidate the earlier inference that ugliness is aesthetic, but
it does importantly qualify it.
1.2 Which kind of ugliness?
What needs to be resolved is which of the three different kinds of aesthetic
judgmentKant had inmindwhenhewrote of ugliness. And this is not straight-
forward. Take the figure of Death in Milton’s Paradise Lost, used by Kant as a
prime example of ugliness:
If shape it might be call’d that shape had none
Distinguishable in member, joynt, or limb,
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Or substance might be call’d that shadow seem’d,
For each seem’d either’ black it stood as Night,
Fierce as ten Furies, terrible as Hell,
And shook a dreadful Dart; what seem’d his head
e likeness of a Kingly Crown had on. (Milton 1667, 2: 667-73)
What does the work here? e displeasure we would experience if we would
face Death asMilton describes him could be of various kinds, relating to any of
the judgments mentioned above: it could be practical (Death is evil), or patho-
logical (he is frightening), just as well as reflectively aesthetic (he is formless).
And all of Kant’s other examples, such as the sight of disease or the devastations
of war, share this ambiguity (CJ 5:312).
What this indicates is that, although it is certainly plausible to understand
them as a kind of aesthetic judgment, it is not decided whether judgments of
ugliness are of the same narrower kind as judgments of beauty, viz. whether
judgments of ugliness are properly reflective. Additionally, it is even a fur-
ther step to suppose that ugliness fits a pure reflective judgment—a judgment
of taste. Here it is important to remember that Kant explicitly distinguishes
between such pure judgments of taste and adherent reflective judgments, in
whichwe judge not solely the object’s formbutmake a reflective aesthetic judg-
ment alongside a concept (CJ 5:229). It is essential to such adherent judgments
that we judge how an object appears to us as an x. To illustrate, when we per-
ceive a rose we can on the one handmake a judgment of taste, and judge on the
basis of this object’s mere appearance, and on the other hand make an adher-
ent judgment and judge its appearance as of a rose. Both are reflective aesthetic
judgments, but their outcomes easily diverge. A fungal infection of the rose’s
petals might actually make a pleasing contribution to the flower’s merely for-
mal appearance, yet it will probably result in displeasure if we judge the con-
taminated sight as of the rose it is. Even though Kant focuses mainly on the
pure reflective judgment of taste, it is crucial that adherent judgments form a
genuine dimension in our everyday encounter with beautiful things.
As a result, it cannot just be assumed that Kant understands ugliness as
recognised in a reflective aesthetic judgment, and we should be careful as well
with the presumption that the judgment of uglinessmust be pure. If we look for
an account of ugliness onKant’s own terms, it already appears sufficient for him
to facilitate a theory either of pathological or of practical ugliness. Such a the-
ory should provide an explication of the cause of displeasure in ugly things, and
in this way account for negative aesthetic judgments. And as a matter of fact,
we find such an account of pathological ugliness in the Critique of the Power of
Judgment. Pathological ugliness is a kind of ugliness that arouses loathing—a
displeasure described as“a strange sensation, resting on sheer imagination” (CJ
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5:312). Intellect is not involved; it is displeasure of a purely sensuous nature,
but aesthetic displeasure nonetheless. No further philosophical explanation is
needed, as such sensuous displeasures rest on contingent biological facts. So
in a sense, Kant might not have omitted anything about ugliness—this may be
all there is to say.
is explanation is both crude and disappointing. However, it supports
the very purpose of the previous discussion: firstly, that we recognise that there
might not be any major role for ugliness in Kant, which would explain its ab-
sence in his aesthetic theory. Surely, it is a genuine phenomenon that demands
explanation, but we should not be surprised by an account portraying ugliness
as sideline phenomenon that is not recognised in a pure judgment of taste at
all. Secondly, the previous discussion reveals what people really worry about
when they wonder whether Kant can allow for ugliness: what we call ‘ugliness’
would in Kant’s terms already be a genuinely reflective ugliness. We take there
to be a negative pole to our experiences of beauty, and regard this as a real di-
mension to how things appear to us. e motivation for worry is that when
Kant cannot incorporate this dimension of our aesthetic lives, his theory sim-
ply is lacking. So we ask, is there a genuine reflective ugliness for Kant? More
precisely, what we wonder is whether Kant can allow a displeasure stemming
from the same subjective source as the one that constitutes our pleasure in the
beautiful. However, the answer to this question is not necessarily the same as
the answer to the questionwhetherKant allows a negative judgment of taste—a
pure reflective judgment of ugliness. is conclusion is pivotal and has been
largely overlooked.
2 Pure reflective judgments of beauty
To be able to see whether Kant can allow the source of the reflective judgment
of beauty to bring about a displeasure, it of course needs to be understoodwhat
this source is. is leads to Kant’s ‘Analytic of Beauty’, the first part of the third
Critique. As is well known, this third Critique functions as a capstone for the
larger system Kant initiated with the earlier two. e very grounding of the
faculties of understanding and reason as provided in the Critique of Pure Rea-
son and the Critique of Practical Reason respectively, Kant realised, ultimately
depends on an indubitable basis for the faculty of judgment. He proceeds by
arguing for the a priori basis for a specific type of judgment—a single type
suffices as proof that the faculty of judgment in toto has grounding prior to
experience. e type of judgment Kant has in mind is of course the peculiar
judgment of taste.5 Epically phrased, when the judgment of taste can be shown
to have a priori justification, Kant’s work is done.
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2.1 e foundations of judgment
Such larger systemic underpinnings are significant in themselves, as they em-
body a constraint that should prevent us to interpret the third Critique in iso-
lation. In other words, any answer to the question whether Kant can allow for
reflective ugliness depends on consistency with the earlier Critiques as well.
e key interest in Kant’s system at this point, however, is in how it helps to
determine the source of pleasure in judgments of beauty as reflective aesthetic
judgments of taste. For Kant precisely this source is a pressing issue. To estab-
lish that judgments of taste indeed rest on a priori principles, it needs to be es-
tablished that such judgments on the one hand are universally communicable,
and on the other claim universal validity; these are the essential preconditions
of a priori knowledge as defended in the first Critique. However, since it only
can be a pure judgment that allows for this a priori grounding, the bewilder-
ing difficulty is that this universally communicable and valid judgment must
be based solely on judgment itself (hence ‘reflective’)—its outcome cannot be
build on what we judge, but must find grounding in the very act of judging.
is purity requirement explains firstly why Kant stresses that the pure
judgment of taste cannot include any sensuous pleasure, and secondly why it
cannot be based on concepts; both would already imply going beyond judg-
ment. In particular the second poses a direct problem. Remembering the
first Critique, where Kant shows that concepts of understanding are simply
required for justification of our judgments—the core of transcendental ideal-
ism—it does seem that without help of cognition the prospects for the a priori
grounding of a non-conceptual judgment are rather dim.
Kant comes up with a solution that is both original and notorious. Briefly
reconstructed, he first of all makes clear that the very structure of this pure
judgment implies that it will be disinterested towards the object judged. Be-
cause it is pure, there must be no logical dependency on concepts or sensuous
imagination. Only the way the object appears to usmatters; its actual existence
is irrelevant. Accordingly, there is no basis for any desiring attitude towards
the object—the judgment is based purely on how a representation, imagina-
tively formed out of intuition, is held up for understanding. Because it is pure
and thus disinterested, everyone would judge the same, given that we simply
share these same rational faculties. is way our judgment of taste is univer-
sally communicable (CJ 5:211).
However, universal validity cannot be that easily obtained. Kant’s entire
system of transcendental idealism centers on the key insight that judgments
are only valid in virtue of facts about cognition itself. For example, the laws of
Newtonian physics are valid, according to Kant, because they can be grounded
a priori on a set of necessary concepts of understanding, such as causality and
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succession. A pure judgment of taste cannot depend on concepts, however.
So for it to be universally valid as well, this lack of concepts must somehow be
made up for. Kant finds a way to do this by recognising a special role for cogni-
tion in pure judgments of taste. As he contends, “it can be nothing other than
the state of mind that is encountered in the relation of the powers of represen-
tation to each other insofar as they relate a given representation to cognition in
general” (CJ 5:217, my emphasis).
We see that, although the content of this pure judgment is strictly non-
conceptual, ‘cognition in general’ stands in, as part of its content. is way,
Kant writes, “the state of mind in this representation must be that of a feeling
of the free play of the powers of representation,” where these powers are imag-
ination, which orders the manifold presented in intuition, and understanding,
which applies the concepts that unify our representations (CJ 5:217). is state
of free play, as it arises in the pure judgment of taste, must be a candidate for
universal communicability, at least among rational agents, because cognition
itself is a determining factor in the occurrence of this state. And the pure judg-
ment of taste is universally valid as well, precisely because a representation of
cognition is the only kind of representation valid for everyone (CJ 5:217).
2.2 Sources of pleasure
epreceding helps in understanding the source of pleasure in beauty. But one
more thing needs to be asked: if this state of free play is brought about in the
pure judgment of beauty, what then brings about its pleasure? FortunatelyKant
is reasonably clear on this, and argues that our pleasure in beauty is a pleasure
in the harmony of the unrestrained functioning of cognition (CJ 5:217). Our
pleasure in beauty is due to imagination and understanding being brought in
a harmonious free play.
At this point it not only has become clear that it is a mental state of a har-
monious free play between imagination and understanding that is the source of
pleasure in a pure judgment of beauty, but also a clearer grasp of the cognitive
functioning that underpins it has become possible. is allows a focus on the
issue whether the kind of mental operation involved in reflective judgments,
like those of taste, could also give rise to displeasure. Given that a harmony
is the exact cause of pleasure, we directly see how plausible it is to proceed by
taking a disharmony of the interplay as the responsible factor in a feeling of re-
flective aesthetic displeasure. In the next section I consider how Henri Allison
defends this suggestion.
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3 Allison’s pursuit of purity
Allison takes it that accounting for the possibility of negative judgments“is cri-
terial for the adequacy of an interpretation of Kant’s theory of taste” (Allison
2001, p. 115). Of course we should agree. However, Allison further stresses
the need for a pure reflective aesthetic judgment of ugliness, and in §1 I ar-
gued that this might very well be unreasonable to demand of Kant’s theory.
Allison does not seem to have a direct argument for why we should look for
purity here. e only thing he says is that “our basic intuitions about aesthetic
valuations surely indicate that negative judgments must have the same status
(as judgments of taste) and the same claim to validity as their positive coun-
terpart” (ibid., p. 71). Moreover, he sees additional support in the three-valued
logic as was introduced earlier, in which ugliness is more than just the absence
of beauty (ibid., p. 71). But as I argued, our common sense has only a single
ballot here, since there is ample of textual evidence that Kant’s use of ‘ugly’
might very well not conform to ours. And since bringing out Kant’s recogni-
tion of aesthetic neutrality itself cannot establish the need for a pure negative
judgment of taste, the jury is still out; at least until more substantial evidence
is given of how pure judgments of ugliness are possible. And providing this is
precisely Allison’s aim.
emain problemAllison faces is to take away doubts that Kant can in fact
conceive of a state of disharmonious free play. Somemight suspect namely that
Kant uses ‘harmonious’ and ‘free’ connected, so that a free play is always already
harmonious. In that case, a disharmonious free play is logically impossible.
Allison believes it is “essential to distinguish between this harmony of the
faculties and their free play” (ibid., p. 116). ‘Free’ denotes the operation of un-
restrained cognition that can result either in a disinterested pleasure or in a dis-
interested displeasure, he states. Rather strong support for this view is found
in Kant’s literal opening statement of the third Critique, where he announces
that we relate a given representation to the feelings of pleasure and displeasure.
Furthermore, and no less important, only the possibility of displeasure in re-
flective judgments allows the ‘quarrels about taste’, on which Kant so heavily
relies (ibid., p. 71). at both pleasure and displeasure are possible in reflective
judgments, Allison explains, “stem[s] from the fact that such reflection can ei-
ther succeed or fail to produce a harmonious relation of the faculties” (ibid., p.
116). If it succeeds, this harmony pleases and constitutes a judgment of beauty,
while if the harmony palpably fails, “the outcome of the free play is a state of
disharmony, where the faculties hinder rather than help one another in their
reciprocal tasks, thereby producing a state of disinterested displeasure and a
negative judgment of taste” (ibid., p. 117). Allison again is able to cite Kant
in support: “To judge an object by taste is to judge whether freedom in the
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play of the imagination harmonises or clashes with the lawfulness of the un-
derstanding” (AP 7:241). Accordingly, there are good reasons to believe that
the harmony Kant speaks of is a qualification of the free play, and not essential
to it.
is account of the possibility of pure reflective aesthetic displeasure is
convincing. It shows how Kant indeed can allow for a reflective ugliness, an
ugliness of disinterested appearance. What further speaks in favour of this
reading is its explanatory potential. I reconstructed how reflective aesthetic
judgments owe their felt character to the free play of understanding and imag-
ination they are grounded in. Now, Allison’s argument reveals how it is a par-
ticular qualification of this free interplay that is able to explain the difference
between pleasure and displeasure in reflective aesthetic judgments.
4 e incoherence of disharmonious cognition
But wemust be careful. I stressed that any reading of theCritiquesmust appre-
ciate the larger system they make up. And how well does the idea of a dishar-
monious free play fit Kant’s overarching system? Guyer maintains that the an-
swer here is ‘not at all’, and he attacks Allison exactly on this point. According
to Guyer, the proposal for displeasure in terms of a disharmony of the faculties
is “blocked by the entire epistemology of the Critique of Pure Reason” (Guyer
2005, p. 146).
4.1 Epistemic requirements
What is precisely the problem Guyer observes? First of all he agrees with Alli-
son that the state of mind grounding our pure judgment of beauty can be char-
acterised as one of a harmonious free play of imagination and understanding
that cannot rely on concepts, and that gives rise to pleasure. But Guyer rejects
Allison’s further claim that an inverse explanation can be employed to explain
displeasure and the judgment of ugliness.
e motivation for this rejection is Kant’s key thesis of transcendental ap-
perception in the Critique of Pure Reason; that it must be possible for me to
include any representation I have in the transcendental unity of my appercep-
tion—or as Kant states, that I must be able to accompany any such representa-
tion with an ‘I think’ (CR 4:B131). One thing this implies, Guyer contends, is
that to be conscious of a representation, understandingmust already be able to
harmonise with imagination, for we have to conceptualise any object of repre-
sentation through an empirical concept in order to be able to ‘think it’ (ibid.,
p. 146). is is involved in making any judgment involving experience. And
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this leads Guyer to formulate what we can call an ‘epistemic requirement’:
(ER) A harmony between imagination and understanding is a precondition
simply for being conscious of an object.
is Epistemic Requirement constrains any reading of Kant’s aesthetic theory,
and Guyer concludes that, though admittedly logically independent, the free
play of imagination and understanding is cognitively necessarily connected
with a harmony of functioning. It implies that the occurrence of a free play
must itself already be sufficient for pleasure (ibid., p. 145). is is how we
should conceive of Kantian beauty according to Guyer.
If this is phrased slightly differently, it can be seen that, since harmony is
a more general cognitive condition that only makes possible a free play and
thus cannot itself explain the pleasure in beauty, only the unrestrained play of
the faculties can figure as a proper explanans of the pleasure in beauty. What
makes us judge beauty simply is this state of free play. As a corollary, no appeal
can be made to any disharmonious free play without contradiction.
Now clearly Kant’s thesis of transcendental apperception itself inevitably
raises intricate epistemic issues, requiring treatment I cannot offer here. It is
fair to say that Guyer correctly recalls the first Critique, and that the mutual
operation of the faculties that is required for the application of empirical con-
cepts is indeed necessary for every conscious representation. But even so, two
open worries remain. Firstly, even apart from the Epistemic Requirement it-
self, the first Critique’s requirement of conceptualisation for conscious experi-
ence that was just granted seems to contradict the third Critique’s need for the
non-conceptual nature of pure judgments of beauty; it was the purity of the
judgment that demanded that no concepts should be involved. And secondly,
it must be considered whether the epistemological harmony Guyer appeals to
in his argument is indeed the ‘harmony’ Kant speaks of in the third Critique.
On a closer look namely the idea of a harmony does not do much work in
Guyer’s argument. And in Kant’s first Critique the concept occurs only twice:
both times used very differently (CR 4:A390, 4:B331/A275).
Let me start with the first worry, the conflict between the third Critique’s
demand for non-conceptuality and the first Critique’s demand for conceptu-
alisation. Guyer is well aware of the problem, and his solution is elegant. He
proposes a better understanding of how the free play comes about by stating
that a pure judgment of beauty results in “a state of free play between [the facul-
ties] that results in harmony without dependence upon any of the determinate
empirical concepts that apply to the object of this state, although surely there
are such concepts” (ibid., p. 147). is solution interprets Kant’s requirement
for purity as semantic: the content of the reflective judgmentmust be free from
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concepts, while it is not necessary that the entire cognitive state underpinning
it be conceptualisation-free. We judge on the basis of a perceptual experience
that necessarily has a conceptual content, but the content of a judgment based
on such experience can be non-conceptual.
On reflection this ‘conceptualist’ reading is quite plausible, and an addi-
tional argument even proves it inevitable:
(1) Assume that we cannot actively decide to conceptualise the
manifold that presents itself, viz. we cannot decide to recognise
a tree as a tree, but this just happens as soon as we possess the
concept , and perceive a tree.
(2) en to claim that in appraising pure beauty we may not ap-
ply concepts at all would require the claim that in order to make a
judgment of pure beauty we must be unable to recognise the ob-
ject.
Such a strong requirement is implausible. It has the consequence that if we
would be able to recognise, say, a waterfall, we could no longer judge the pure
beauty of a particularwaterfall, sincewe cannot help perceiving it conceptually,
namely as a waterfall. We can judge objects purely on the basis of their form,
yet be very familiar with what they are. To respond that this is no problem for
the view that no concepts may be applied, because in such a case we simply
abstract from our recognition to judge the object purely, would already be to
endorse Guyer’s very solution.
Indeed, the additional argument just introduced brings out that the possi-
bility for abstraction becomes a requirement for pure judgments. On Guyer’s
conceptualist reading of Kantian experience, concepts will always be involved
as a precondition of experience itself, even though they are not regarded a nec-
essary part of the content of judgments based on experience. Such general pos-
sibility of abstraction is compatible with Kant, who makes a similarly general
claim that he who judges an object with a determinate end can make a pure
judgment if he “either had no concept of this end or abstracted from it in his
judgment” (CJ 5:231). It turns out, then, that abstraction from conceptualisa-
tion must be a general requirement for pure reflective judgments.
e conclusion is that Guyer’s objection to Allison, the objection based
on a conceptualist reading of experience, implies no general threat to the
project of Kant’s third Critique. However, explanations of ugliness in terms
of disharmony can only be ruled out if the Epistemic Requirement defined
above is sound. And this ultimately depends onGuyer’s understanding of ‘har-
mony’—the indicated second worry.
For Guyer ‘harmony’ simply is equivalent to the cognitive co-operation of
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imagination and understanding. Only this allows his premise that in cognition
“the application of a concept to the manifold brings the faculty of understand-
ing into harmony with a manifold of sensibility reproduced by the imagina-
tion” (Guyer 2005, p. 146). And indeed, this would establish the Epistemic
Requirement.
However, there are good reasons to reject the simple conflation of cogni-
tive harmony and cognitive co-operation. On Guyer’s reading both ordinary
cognition and pure judgments of beauty depend on this harmony. Earlier, I
argued that an implication of this is that we can only appeal to the presence of
the free play itself in order to explain our pleasure in beauty. It is the occur-
rence of this free play that in itself must be pleasurable to explain our pleasure
in beauty. Furthermore, I concluded that in order to prevent Guyer’s picture
from contradicting the Kantian constraints on the judgment of taste, the pos-
sibility of abstraction from our concepts must be allowed. When we abstract
from the concepts applied in experience we are able to judge on mere appear-
ance alone, hence to bring about unrestrained cognition—a free play of the
faculties.
But now a problem arises. e possibility to abstract from concepts in
order to judge freely undermines the very explanatory potential of the free
play itself. is is because, as long as we abstract from our conceptualisation
to establish unrestricted cognition, on this reading we would be able to find
everything beautiful. And this clearly conflicts with what Kant holds, not only
because he speaks of there being ugly objects, but more directly because he so
explicitly affirms the possibility of aesthetic neutrality. We need to explain why
abstraction from concepts in our perception of some objects results in judging
them to be aesthetically neutral, while with other objects we feel the pleasures
of beauty. Simply referring to a free play here is no longer explanatory. e
most plausible way to go is to reintroduce a means to qualify the free play.
In fact, Guyer already tends to do this himself, when he explains what hap-
pens when we judge beauty. He asserts that it
must be a feeling that is unified in some way that goes beyond
the unity that is dictated by whatever determinate concept the ob-
ject is subsumed under—as it were, an excess of felt unity or har-
mony. (ibid., p. 149)
And he further speaks of a “further degree of unity” (ibid., p. 150). Both state-
ments indicate that the pleasure related to beauty involves not any sort of har-
mony, but a harmony of a special kind. In other words, the cognitive state
underpinning our pure judgments of beauty must not be regarded as an in-
stance of just any co-operation of the faculties, but as one of a rather ideal state
of mutual harmony.
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It seems that at this point Guyer is in fact not far removed from Allison,
who also distinguishes ‘ordinary’ harmony from instances where there is per-
fect congruity between our cognitive faculties (Allison 2001, p. 117). Allison
does not deny that we can recognise some form of harmony in ordinary cog-
nitive functioning. Yet, we must understand this type of relation between our
cognitive faculties in terms of its purest instances. And these purest instances
are of course found in a judgment of taste. But they can also be found on one
other occasion, in cases where there is no state of free play of our faculties,
viz. where a concept enters the content of the judgment. Allison stresses that
the mutual harmony of our faculties in absence of a free play is most pure in
judgments of perfection. In a judgment of perfection “the harmony is based
on a determinate concept of the object”, Allison explains, “which leaves no
scope for the free activity of the imagination” (ibid., p. 117; emphasis added).
So we recognise something as perfect when the concept that our understand-
ing applies completely ‘fits’ the manifold offered by our senses—instantiating
a cognitive harmony outside cases of beauty.
If this is correct, ideal harmony thus reveals itself on two occasions: (i)
in pure beauty, where understanding in general harmonises with unrestricted
imagination, and (ii) in perfection, when a concept is able to fully restrain op-
erative imagination. And the distinction between ideal states of harmony and
‘common’ harmonious functioning implies that cognitive harmony will come
in degrees. Its essence, or principle, is to be found in ideal states of ‘maximal
co-operation’, and further down the line it will be contaminated bymismatches
in experience. It is nomore than natural to place a disharmony at the opposing
logical extreme, so that common cognition will form an aesthetically neutral
midpoint, nicely paralleling Kant’s three-valued logic.
Precisely this gradual model justifies Guyer’s explications in terms of ‘fur-
ther degrees of unity’, by which he simply indicates that in judgments of beauty
the cognitive harmony is close to ideal. Moreover, as I have argued, he must
necessarily embrace such a model to be able to sufficiently qualify the free play
involved in beauty; a qualification that is necessary in order to prevent the
unwelcome outcome of ubiquitous beauty. is leads to the further conclu-
sion that Guyer’s Epistemic Requirement for the necessity of a harmony must
be weakened in order to be consistent with Kant’s theory. What is required
in this weakened version is at minimum a functional co-operation of under-
standing and imagination, though the free interplay still allows for especially
pleasurable instances aptly described in Kant’s third Critique as ‘harmonious’.
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4.2 e cognitive impossibility of pure disharmony
Nevertheless, even in its weakened form Guyer’s Epistemic Requirement af-
fects Allison’s thesis. Recall, Allison defends that Kant allows for a pure reflec-
tive aesthetic judgment of ugliness. For such a negative reflective judgment to
be pure, the interplay of the faculties needs to be fully free. But if this free play
is subsequently qualified as disharmonious in order to explain the displeasure
involved in ugliness, as Allison does, he is committed to a pure state of dishar-
mony as well. is might not be directly obvious. But we must realise that it is
a plain consequence of Allison’s pursuit of purity that only disharmony in its
purest form can ground the negative judgment of taste. What is implied here
is the extreme pole of the three-valued model, so that wherever there remains
the logical possibility of a maximally disharmonious state only that state forms
the principle of a pure reflective aesthetic judgment of ugliness.
e problem for any model that wishes to account for negative judgments
of taste in terms of disharmony is that, in the purely disharmonious instances
of cognition that suchmodel describes, cognition itself inevitably breaks down.
It would be ad hoc to explicate a pure disharmony both as an insuperable hin-
drance of the faculties, while at the same time they are co-operating. So, even
when the Epistemic Requirement is weakened, Guyer is still able to maintain
that a logical possibility of pure judgments of ugliness does not imply the re-
quired cognitive possibility. A free state of disharmony provides an incoherent
model for ugliness. It must be concluded that if we look for a pure Kantian
judgment based on a disharmony of the faculties, these objections block any
attempt.
5 e disharmony restrained
Still, this does not rule out all possibilities for disharmony. Indeed as long
as we take into account the more nuanced way Kant conceived of ugliness, I
argued, there is no clear reason why we would demand a pure judgment of
ugliness. Although the kind of disharmony Allison envisages turned out to
be cognitively impossible, we can still formulate a more modest proposal: in
light of the previous we can construct an argument for a reflective aesthetic
judgment of ugliness that is not pure, but adherent.
is proposal bases itself on the possibility of a relative disharmony. It
agrees with Guyer that, although a pure disharmony is a logical possibility,
this conceptual point does not establish the real possibility of an “insuperable
disharmony between imagination and understanding” (Guyer 2005, p. 146n).
But it also agrees with Allison that there is a genuine sense in which the dishar-
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monious interplay of the faculties can displease in reflective aesthetic judg-
ments.
Earlier I noted that Kant recognised a class of adherent reflective aesthetic
judgments that are impure because in such judgments the freedom of imag-
ination is restricted by a concept of the object. I noted that it is essential to
such adherent judgments that we judge how an object appears to us as an x.
is concept involved is part of the content of the judgment, so on the semantic
reading adopted such judgments are clearly impure. e imaginative represen-
tation of the object can be related with an understanding of how such an object
should represent itself to us, according to the concept we have of it. Kant states
this ‘theory’ of adherent beauty very briefly in the sixteenth section of his third
Critique, which conveys that,
the beauty of a human being […], the beauty of a horse, of a build-
ing […] presuppose a concept of the end that determines what
the thing should be, hence a concept of its perfection, and is thus
merely adherent beauty. (CJ 5:230)
Of course the exact thrust of Kant’s extremely sketchy theory of such ad-
herent beauty is controversial. at notwithstanding, my use of it will be com-
patible with the different readings that have been given of this passage.6 e
crucial and uncontroversial point about adherent judgments we must under-
stand Kant to make, is that in judging an object ‘adherently’ we presuppose
a concept of what the object ought to be, for we compare the representation
of the object with a concept we have of the perfection of such an object. And
in order to do this, it is necessary to also subsume the object under the same
concept, in which according to Kant “imagination, which is as it were at play
in the observation of the shape, would merely be restricted” (CJ 5:230).
Now, it was clear that in judging perfection a concept that our understand-
ing applies to an object presented in sense perception completely ￿fits￿ the
object as imagination presents it. As a corollary, there is no scope for any free
activity of imagination itself. But not so when we judge adherent beauty: in-
deed, also here a concept restrains imagination, but precisely because adherent
beauty is still a reflective aesthetic judgment—it is still beauty—there is always
some room for imagination to make an extra contribution that is not part of
the concept we have of the object itself.
Any understanding of adherent beauty rests on the fact that also the free-
dom of imagination comes by degrees. On the one hand, if imagination were
fully free a judgment would be pure, while on the other, as Allison described,
imagination can also be fully restrained in this freedom, in which case it
grounds the practical aesthetic judgment of perfection.7 In between lie both
to appear in: Esthetica: Tijdschri voor Kunst en Filosofie 2010
E  U 17
ordinary cognition and adherent beauty. Given this, a difference must be ac-
counted for: there is no remarkable pleasure in ordinary recognition of an ob-
ject as a chair, while judging a species of rose beautiful precisely because it is
a rose certainly brings us pleasure. So, it must be asked: what explains the
specific pleasure we have in adherent beauty?
e answer is that since it is for Kant still a form of beauty, this explanation
must be a qualification of the free interplay of the faculties of imagination and
understanding—which is now a relatively free interplay, of course. Also in the
case of adherent beauty Kant takes it that in ‘comparing’ the representation
with a concept (with how it ought to be) “we cannot avoid at the same time
holding it together with the subject,” and so we make a reflective judgment in
which, as Kant puts it, “the entire faculty of the powers of representation gains if
both states ofmind are in agreement” (CJ 5:231). And such agreement can only
be a state of harmony—although in contrast with pure beauty it does not have
to be maximal. Moreover, it cannot even be maximal due to understanding’s
restrictive conceptualisation.
What is crucial to recognise here is that in these adherent reflective judg-
ments a state of disharmony can be realised without this leading to any epis-
temic problems. is is because in such an adherent judgment we appraise the
interplay between imagination restricted by a concept, and understanding of
the end carried with this concept. is way, a minimal degree of co-operation
is already a precondition for adherent judgments in general. If now the rela-
tively free interplay involved in a particular range of these judgments would
be disharmonious, this disharmony itself can again only be relative. It would
mean that imagination, in the degree of freedom le for it, hinders the appli-
cation of the concept to a particular object, even though understanding has
correctly recognised the object as fitting the concept.
Consider an illustrative case. You apply a determinate concept to a par-
ticular object, simply in recognising it, for example, as a face. But in doing so
you judge, reflectively, that though this object has been, and should have been
subsumed under this concept, it still leaves scope for free activity of the imag-
ination in representing the object. More precisely, this ‘excess’ of unrestricted
activity of imagination, regarded in light of the concept understanding has of
how faces should look, hinders rather than helps the subsumption that takes
place. Such interplay of the faculties of imagination and understanding here
is relatively disharmonious, and a poor instance of the co-operation in com-
mon cognition. A displeasure is felt due to this state. You now have reflectively
judged the object to be ugly.
Consequently, a disharmonious interplay of the faculties of imagination
and understanding can indeed be the source of displeasure in a reflective aes-
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thetic judgment. It results not in a pure reflective judgment, and no universal
communicability or universal validity is demanded. Yet, I have argued why
this is so, and why there is neither a possibility nor a need for such a judgment
to be pure. is is Kant’s understanding of how things displease ‘by the look
of them’, and this makes it possible to conclude that he can indeed account for
a reflective aesthetic of ugliness.
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2Strictly, Kant’s theory is modality-neutral. Here I limit myself to examples of visual ugli-
ness, but I take my conclusions to be sufficiently general to equally apply to other senses. Our
common conception of auditory ugliness, I suppose, would be one of something’s ‘sounding
nasty’. I do, however, believe that our intuitions are strongest in the visual cases, and I further
doubt whether there is such a thing as olfactory or gustatory ugliness, or a kind of ugliness
that belongs to the skin senses.
3“Häßlichkeit ist also was positives, nicht eine blosse Abwesenheit der Schönheit sondern
auch das Daseyn dessen, was der Schönheit zuwider ist.” e translation is my own.
4e object judged can be called the ‘objective source’. If I judge a flower, this organism
now is the objective source of the pleasure I feel. Yet this source is too specific to individuate
judgment-types, as different objective sources (rainbows, foliage) can all lead to the same type
of judgment. Unqualified occurrences of ‘source of pleasure’ will in what follows solely denote
the subjective source.
5is is why the debate about ugliness in Kant is crucial: the judgment he finds justification
for must exist to be of use. It would be inadmissible for Kant to just concoct the required pure
judgment out of the blue—this would lead to an ad hoc foundation, only introduced to save a
theory. So it is tantamount that judgments of taste have an actual place in our lives. Kant thinks
this is warranted, given that most of our everyday beauty is recognised in adherent reflective
judgments. Pure reflective judgments of taste, then, belong to the same species as our everyday
judgments. Yet, a corollary of this is that if we consider ugliness to be a genuine dimension to
our ‘ordinary’ aesthetic judgments as well, Kant’s theory must be able to incorporate ugliness.
When a proper understanding of the phenomenon of ugliness in Kantian terms leads to a
contradiction, this would be devastating for the very raison d’être of the third Critique.
6In fact, according to Guyer the different readings of the passage do not even conflict,
but must be considered as different implications of “Kant’s all too brief but actually quite rich
account” (Guyer 2005, p. 135).
7is reading helps to understand why Kant states that “Strictly speaking, however, per-
fection does not gain by beauty, nor does beauty gain by perfection,” for they simply rule each
other out as contraries on this scale of imaginative freedom (CJ 5:231).
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